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ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKIIING AND THE COURTS
BUGENE J. KEEFEt

G OVERNMENT through the medium of administrative agencies is
not new. In England, during the reign of Henry VIII, the Statute
of Sewers' was enacted, which set up a governing commission. That
the administrative method of controlling human activity has steadily
increased in England is demonstrated by reports2 and text books3 containing data upon the subject. Our own Interstate Commerce Commission is over fifty-two years old.' Indeed, allowance of customs payments
was controlled by an agency almost one hundred years before the Interstate Commerce Commission was created. Since the creation of the
latter Commission this country has witnessed a tremendous increase in
the number of governmental agencies operating under delegated authority.6 Despite the length of our experience and the steadily increasing
frequency with which we resort to creating commissions, we are, to a
large extent, still in the groping stage.7 One of the dark areas is found
in the field contemplated by the question-to what extent should our
courts supervise the actions of our administrative agencies? There are
two schools of thought: first, those who believe that personal and
property rights of individuals should be protected by our courts, even
if the speed and efficiency of administrative agencies are impaired;"
second, those who contend that the expert agency is far better qualified
'I Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
The writer contemplates an accompanying article in an early issue entitled, "Administrative Adjudication and the Courts."
1. 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1531).
2. See PEPORT OP a= Commann oN A , -sMs'POwERs (1932) Cmd 40G0.
3. See RoBsoN, Justice AN ADimsTRATXIVE L.%v (1928); HmwArr, TnL Nrv,, Dan-

ro-sa

(1929).

4. The Interstate Commerce Commission was created on February 4, 1SS7.
5. See 1 Stat. 29, c. 32 (1789).

6. It has been estimated that there are over 600 federal adminirative agencies alone.
7. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (193s)

YA

L. J. 647.

47

0

8. Pound, Adminstrative Application of Legal Standards (1919) 44 A. B. A. RxP. 445,
462; Vanderbilt, The Place of the Adminstrative Tribunal in our Legal System. (1933)
24 A. B. A. J. 267.
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than the inexpert court, and, moreover, that any supervision by the latter
is bold usurpation without constitutional basis. 9 Those in the first school
are called fundamentalists or constitutionalists, but their more aggressive
opponents call them reactionaries or devotees of a laissez faire policy.
Those in the second school claim to be progressives, but those who
disagree with them place tags of radicalism, or more gently, of realism,
upon them.
To state the question generally or to place the opposing writers in
general categories doesn't assist very much in attempting to arrive at a
solution. 10 It is essential that we break down the larger problem into
smaller issues and discuss each one separately, if we are to arrive at
any actionable knowledge. It is proposed in this paper to discuss
administrative rule-making as distinguished from administrative adjudication." In other words, the subject contemplated is the degree of
control by our courts over agencies exercising quasi-legislative functions,
that is, over agencies who regulate rather than decide. The other type
of administrative function, often called the quasi-judicial function, will
be referred to only for comparative purposes. The distinction between
the two functions is sometimes questioned because of one agency at
different times exercising each function, and in close cases there is the
difficulty of ascertaining whether a particular action is quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative.1' It certainly is not accurate to say that the function
of the agency is quasi-judicial when a hearing has been held, because
hearings are very often granted before a rule or regulation is enacted
by an administrative agency. Hearings are granted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in equipment and rate questions prior to the
issuance of regulations on these matters. Conversely, it is not accurate
to state that the function of an administrative agency is quasi-legislative
because no hearing has been held. In the defective food cases, the
agency may, under the police power, decide that certain food be destroyed, and this decision, in the interest of public health, may be
reached without affording a hearing to the owner.1" Certainly this
9. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YAxr, L. J.
577, 594, 595; Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE L.
529-531.

3.

A19,

10. Feller, supra note 7, at 674.
i1.
12.

See BrcacrY & OATmA, ADmmNsTaRATIw LEISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934).
See Fuchs, PROCEDURE N ADnaNSTRATIVE RULE-MAXINO (1938) 52 HARv. L. REV.

259, 262-4.
13. North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908). The court wrote,
"We are of the opinion, however, that a provision for a hearing before seizure and condemnation and destruction of food which is unwholesome and unfit for use, is not necessary." Id. at 315. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass.
540 (1891).
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function is not legislative. It is suggested that the function is quasijudicial when the action of the agency is based upon facts adduced in
evidence which is followed by an order or decision which will have no
future effect generally; whereas the function is quasi-legislative when
an order or regulation issues having future application.' 4 This states a
fair line of distinction. But probably a better statement of the true
distinction is the following: If the regulation or determination contemplates "indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations",
it is quasi-legislative; but if the finding or decision contemplates "named
or specified persons or situations", it is quasi-judicialV1
Having confined our subject to the extent of judicial control over
administrative agencies in their quasi-legislative or rule-making function,
it now becomes necessary to further break down the problem within
this subject matter. Probably the best analysis lies in considering separately the points of contact between administrative boards and the
courts, that is, at what points have the courts stepped in to consider the
validity of the regulation? A comprehensive view of the cases indicates
that the courts have supervised administrative regulation at three main
points. The courts have intervened to ascertain (1) the validity of the
statute which creates the administrative agency, (2) the validity of the
administrative regulation, and (3) the procedure in enacting the regulation. It is now proposed to examine these points of judicial supervision
and briefly discuss whether our courts, particularly our Supreme Court,
have usurped power or unnecessarily impaired efficiency in our administrative bodies in their zeal to protect personal and property rights of
individuals and corporations.
The Validity of the Creating Statute
On this basic question as to the validity of the creating statute, have
our courts exercised a proper restraint in supervising this portion of
the administrative process? Have our courts usurped power?
At the outset we encounter the rule that the creating statute must
contain a norm or standard to guide the created administrative agency."
This means that the agency may make detailed rules and regulations
within the prescribed field, the theory being that the legislature, state or
federal, makes the general law in the statute and the agency makes rules
and regulations within that area. That is to say, the agency does not
legislate, rather it implements. Our courts properly impose this super14. BLAcnrx & OATmc., op. cit. supra note 11.
15. Fucbs, supra note 12, at 265.
16. The Aurora, 7 Cranch 3S2 (U. S. 1S13); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892);
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
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visory rule. It is a compelling result of two fundamental principles.
First, the doctrine of the separation of powers;" and second, the principle
that each department of government, executive, legislative and judicial,
being itself a delegate of governmental power, cannot delegate that
power.1 8 Let us see briefly how the rule requiring a norm or standard
in the creating statute must be imposed if these two basic doctrines are
to remain a part of our legal philosophy. The statutes creating administrative bodies submit themselves to the following division, inter alia,
(a) statutes creating power in another of the three governmental departments, for example, the National Recovery Act, 19 wherein Congress,
the legislative department, granted power to the President, the executive
department, or the Tariff Acts,20 wherein again the legislative department
granted power to the executive department; and (b) statutes creating
outside administrative agencies and giving them power, for example,
the Interstate Commerce Act, 2 creating the Commission of that 'name
or the Fair Trade Act,22 creating the Fair Trade Commission. If the
statute is of the (a) type, the requisite of a norm or standard must be
imposed. Otherwise Congress could delegate full law-making powers to
the executive as distinguished from granting him power to fill in details
within a certain prescribed field. This would be a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine; 23 our executive branch would be making
and enforcing our laws. Hence, since the rule follows from the principle,
the rule must remain if the principle is sound. The doctrine of separation of powers is essential to liberty. If the executive department took
over the law-making function, the principle of limited powers in our
legislative branches finding their origin in the people's sovereignty would
not have application to the executive department and our democratic
form of government would gradually be displaced by a totalitarian state,
or at least one approaching that type. What is liberty? Liberty would
seem to exist only in that area of law making which the people have not
delegated to legislatures, state or federal, or if there has been delegation,
it has hot been exercised. It might be argued that the fundamental
17.

MONTESQUIEU, THE SPxrIT op LAWS (6th ed. 1793)

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1939).
46 STAT. 763 (1930), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1001 (1937).
34 STAT. 587 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1934).
52 STAT. 111, 15 U. S. C. A. § 41 (Supp. 1938).
moNEsQuIEU, op. cit. supra note 17, at 113.

113.

"When the legislative

and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there
is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive."
18. A free translation of the Latin maxim, "delegatuts nton potest delegare."
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concept of reserved rights in the people recognized by constitutional
principles would be protected because Congress or the legislatures could
only delegate those powers which they had received from the people.
Hence, the executive could go no further in legislative action than Congress. True, in constitutional principle, he could not, but would he?
This argument ignores the principle and practice of congressional debate
and deliberation protected by parliamentary rules and productive of
better results than the hurried and arbitrary decrees of one individual.
The check of deliberation is generally present in democracies. It is not
present in dictatorships. The contention may be advanced that the
Supreme Court could intervene if the executive were to transgress the
Constitution. This is to suspend the liberty of the people during the.
period of enforcement before the Supreme Court acts. Moreover, it
would permit the executive to initiate legislation, rather than to propose
it, thereby sacrificing the legislative curb on the executive and relying
wholly upon judicial action. The legislative check is more efficacious,
in that it is preventive, while the judicial is only curative. The legislature which has not abdicated to the executive" can refuse to enact
legislation; the judicial department can only tell the legislature that it
should have refused to pass the given statutes.
Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of governmental powers has
been the subject of a great deal of interpretation. Even as early as
The Federalist, James Madison contended that the French statesman
meant not that there should be no partial overlapping, but that one
department of government should not wholly enter another. Montcsquieu's primary consideration was the preservation of liberty; if liberty
were to be lost by the abandonment of a legislative check upon the
executive in one field, then to that extent liberty would be impaired and
the loss would have been caused by failing to keep governmental powers
separate. This would have violated Montesquieu's doctrine. It would
seem that Montesquieu argued not merely against an entire overlapping
of departmental powers, but also against a partial invasion. -4 Have our
courts permitted the abdication by the legislative to the executive department? To some extent they have. It must be conceded that to some
extent the Madisonian theory has been followed in practice. This judicial
leniency is certainly no indication of usurpation or judicial imposition
of rigid adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers or unnecessary
impairment of the efficiency of administrative bodies by the judiciary.
24. Id. at page 119: "As the executive power has no othler part in the legislative than
the privilege of rejecting, it can have no share in the public debates.' Id. at page 118:
"But should the legislative power usurp a share of the executive, the latter would be
equally undone. . .. .. (Italics inserted).
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It has also been argued that Montesquieu's doctrine is a political
theory and not a mandatory legal doctrine.25 The inference is that he
advanced it as a matter of governmental theory, not as a basis for judicial action in the event of its violation. In other words, if we concede
that it is excellent political theory to keep the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches separate, then that is as far as we need to go to be
in perfect accord with Montesquieu. This contention seems to be debatable. He knew that the judicial department must have sanctioning power
upon the violation of this separation.2" Of what avail would it be to
provide that the legislative and executive departments be kept separate
unless we created a third department and empowered it to say that the
separation had been ignored and to invalidate the action which violated
the separation?
If the statute is of the (b) type, wherein a special commission is
created, the argument that there must be a norm or guide is usually
based upon the Latin maxim, delegatus non potest delegare. Of course,
if the administrative agency created is looked upon as being in the
executive branch of government, the prohibition against separation of
powers may also be resorted to in attacking the statute. But generally
the prohibition against delegating delegated powers seems more applicable in this type of statute.
That the rule requiring a norm or standard to be present in the
creating statute follows from the non-delegation principle needs but brief
treatment. If there is no norm or standard contained in the statute
creating the new agency, the agency in making regulations will not be
merely filling in details within a prescribed area, it will actually be
legislating. In this event, there will have been a delegation of law making
power. We would then have administrative legislation, which is improper,
rather than legislative administration, which is proper. The rule therefore is rendered necessary by the principle, delegatus non potest delegare.
The principle against delegation of legislative power is sound under
our form of government.27 The reasons for its soundness are largely
similar to those underlying the doctrine of separate powers. The people
in their sovereignty may delegate law making power, but the delegate is
not thereby impowered to redelegate. The people in their delegation rely
upon their chosen delegates, and would be most unsafe in their reliance
25.

O'Reilly, Administrative Absolutism (1938)

7 FORDIIAa

L. Rav. 310, 317.

26. MONTFSQUIEU, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118: "But, in general, the legislative power
cannot try causes; and much less can it try this particular case, where it represents the
party aggrieved, which is the people."
27. See discussion in DiCaNsoN, ADmNSTRATIVE JUsTICE AND TnE SUPREmAcY or LAW
(1927) 1S-18.

1939]

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING

if the delegate could redelegate to another, not chosen by the people.
The courts are certainly reasonable in preserving this principle, and they
have adopted a reasonable rule to attain this end.
This discussion of these general concepts seems appropriate in dealing
with judicial supervision over administrative rule-making, but it does
not give a complete answer to our question of whether the courts have
usurped power in their intervention at this first step in the administrative
process, to wit, a consideration of the validity of the creating statute.
To make our answer more complete, it is well to turn to more minute
rules and to the cases construing them.
There are, speaking from the norm or standard point of view generally,
two types of creative administrative statutes: (a) the statute which
gives specific conditions under which the administrative officer or board
may act or refuse to act,2 and (b) the statute which leaves the rulemaking or deciding within the discretion generally of the administrative
agency without specifying any guides as to the use of that discretion.'
The (a) type of statute certainly is in conformity with the rule requiring
that the creative statute contain a norm or standard. 'What have our
courts done, when the (b) type of statute appears, on the question as
to whether it conforms to the norm or standard rule?
We must divide our cases into classes in answering this question.
The division of cases is largely dependent upon the type of enterprise
or business sought to be controlled by the creating administrative statute
involved in the case. The following division of cases wherein uncontrolled
administrative discretion was granted seems fairly comprehensive: (1)
cases presenting statutes giving administrative control over businesses
or enterprises which are not permeated with possible danger to public
safety, health or morals; 30 (2) cases presenting statutes giving administrative control over businesses or enterprises which have inherent in
3
them possible danger to public safety, health or morals; ' (3) cases
2S. In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 494 (1904), the statute involved provided in § 1, thereof, that "to import or bring into the United States any merchandLe as
tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to the standards provided in Section 3 of this act, and the importation of all such merchandie is hereby prohibited."
29. People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905); Hays v. Poplar
Bluff, 263 Mlo. 516, 173 S. W. 676 (1915). See Patterson, Minslerial aral Dicretionary
Officia Acts (1922) 20 ATc. L. Rrv. 848, 882.
30. State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 At!. 385 (1921) ; Park Hill Development Co. V.
Evansville, 190 Ind. 432, 130 N. E. 645 (1921); Seattle v. Gibson, 96 'Wash. 425, 165
Pac. 109 (1917).
31. Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co, 249 U. S. 479 (1919); llinois State
Board of Dental Examiners v. People, 20 Ill. App. 457, afd, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201
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presenting statutes giving administrative control over mere privilege; 82
(4) cases wherein the subject matter sought to be controlled renders it
impracticable or impossible to prescribe a nori or standard to guide
the discretion of the administrative agency; 8 3 (5) cases wherein the
jurisdiction to act administratively is dependent upon a condition subsequently arising.84
It is to be noted that in each classification named, we are dealing
with the (b) type of statute, which grants unguided discretion to the
administrative agency. How have our courts applied the rule requiring
a norm or standard in each classification? Have they usurped judicial
power or unnecessarily interfered with the efficacy of administrative
bodies?
In the first classification we have cases wherein the business or
enterprise is perfectly lawful and wherein, because of the subject matter
sought to be controlled, the statute could prescribe specifications to
guide the administrative agency. Our courts have adopted the rule that,
in this class, a statute giving totally unguided discretion does not conform to the rule requiring that the creating statute have a norm or
standard. However, in the next three classes of cases, namely, cases
involving statutes granting uncontrolled administrative discretion concerning matters within the police power of the state, cases involving
statutes granting similar discretion over matters constituting mere privilege, and cases wherein the subject matter sought to be controlled by
the statute renders it impracticable or impossible to guide administrative
discretion, our courts have held that these statutes, containing no guide
as to exercise of this discretion, are valid. This has been done by
judicially incorporating into the statute the requisite of "reasonableness".3 5 The judiciary has repeatedly held that the legislatures contemplated that the use of discretion granted, not expressly controlled
(1887); People v. Grant, 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 964 (1891); People ex rel. Copcutt v.
Board of Health, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
32. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924). The court wrote: " . . . a distinction
must be observed between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged In as a
matter of right and one carried on by government sufferance or permission." Id. at 145.
It is universally recognized that there is (in the case of a license to exercise a mere

privilege) no element of property right or vested interest of any kind. Being so, It may
be a necessary consequence that rules of law, protective of vested rights, are without
influence in respect of such a privilege.
33. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917); Gaylord v. Pasadena, 175 Cal.
433, 166 Pac. 348 (1929); Mihvaukee v. Rissling, 184 Wis. 517, 199 N. W. 61 (1924).
34. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1891); Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394

(1928).
35. Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160 (1911); Ex parte Holmes, 187
Cal. 640, 203 Pac. 398 (1921).
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by any guide, was intended to be controlled by the use of reason on
the part of the administrative agency." The courts thereby eradicated
any intention on the part of the legislature to grant the use of arbitrary
power to the administrator. In other words, when there was any excuse
or justification for the legislative omission of a norm, such as the statutes
involving police power, granting mere privilege or dealing with a subject
matter rendering the stating of a norm impracticable, the courts have
stepped in and saved the statute by furnishing, themselves, the norm of
reasonableness. Is this usurpation of power? In the first classification,
where the legislature could incorporate specifications and the statute
deals with a business or enterprise which an individual has a right to
engage in, it certainly is safer to require a legislature, seeking to impose
restrictions upon a legitimate business through an administrative agency,
to expressly prevent arbitrariness.
Let us look at decided cases under each classification. Probably the
most common example of our first division, the control of a perfectly
lawful business or enterprise, is found in the public speaking cases T
The right to free speech is constitutionally guaranteedP Its statutory
restriction should be carefully scrutinized. Its control by statute through
an administrative agency does lend itself to specific guides which could
be enacted into the creating statute. The administrator under the statute
might be empowered to refuse permission to assemble where there is
danger of rioting or the probability of the dissemination of doctrines
advocating anarchy. The granting of unguided discretion controlling
the privilege to speak in a public place has been held invalid under our
norm or standard rule. 9 Yet this same form of statute has been upheld
upon the ground that it is to be placed under the privilege classification
and that therefore the statute needs no express norm or standard. 0
The operation of steam engines within a city has been held to come
within the first classification and require a stated norm or guide, controlling discretion.4 ' The use of the city streets for parade purposes has
been held to come under this classification. Hence a statute granting
unregulated discretion was held invalid.
36. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 (1931); Continental Baking Co. V. Woodring, 286
U. S. 352 (1932); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603 (1927).
37. Davis v. Mlass., 167 U. S. 43 (1896); Hague v. Committce for Industrial Organization, 83 L. Ed. 928 (June 5, 1939); State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 19D, 113 At]. 335 (1921).

33. U. S. Co~sT. Amendment I.
39. State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 At. 385 (1921).
40. Davis v. Mlass, 167 U. S. 43 (1896); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 83 L. Ed. 928 (June 5, 1939).
41. Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878).
42. Frazee's Case, 63 Bich. 296 (1886).
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In our police power cases,43 we find statutes containing no norm or
guide regulating administrative discretion, but the statutes were sustained
by the judicial implication of reasonableness.4 4 Such statutes granted
control over the sale of meat, 45 over the sale of milk, 40 over the storage
of gasoline, 47 over the erection and maintenance of hospitals, 8 and over
*
the use of the streets by automotive transportation companies. 4
In the privilege cases (requiring no norm in the creative statutes other
than the vesting of discretion) there are such examples as, statutes
granting unregulated control over theatres and motion picture films,50
over the practice of medicine,"1 over the storage of gasoline, 2 over
making speeches in public places. 53 The statutes here were saved by
the judicial implication of "reasonableness," to modify the discretion
granted.
Under the class of cases presenting statutes where the express statement of a norm would be impracticable or impossible, we find authorities
wherein statutory control through administrative delegation is sought
over theatres and motion picture films,5 4 over admission to the practice
of medicine, over entry into the laundry business,55 over insurance
rates,57 over fire escapes on certain types of buildings,5 8 over licenses
for teachers,5 9 dentists,0 doctors,5 1 and employment agencies. 2 It is
to be noted how impossible it would be to expressly state the norm or
43. See excellent discussion in Sigler, The Problem of Apparently Unguided Adminlstrative Discretion (1934) 19 ST. Lotus L. REv. 261.
44. Buffalo v. Hill, 79 App. Div. 402, 79 N. Y. Supp. 449 (4th Dep't 1903).
45. Ibid.
46. People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 175 N. Y. 440, 67 N. E. 913 (1903),
aff'd, 199 U. S. 552 (1905).
47. San Antonio v. Rubin, 42 Fed. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
48. Blackman v. Atlanta, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525 (1914).
49. Lane v. Whitaker, 275 Fed. 476 (D. Conn. 1921).
50. Oakley v. Richards, 275 Mo. 266, 204 S. W. 505 (1918).
51. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1923); Dillard v. Board of Medical Examiners,
69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866 (1921).
52. Matter of Larkin v. Schwab, 242 N. Y. 330, 151 N. E. 637 (1926).
53. Davis v. Mass, 167 U. S. 43 (1896).
54. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm., 236 U. S. 230 (1915).
55. Mathews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. 750, 63 S. W. 785 (1901).
56. Yee Bow v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio 269, 124 N. E. 132 (1919).
57. State v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928). See PATERSON, TuE INsuRAwca ComsIssio zR i3N mx U ruxa STATES (1927) 389, 340, 406.
52. Plymouth Coal Company v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531 (1914).
59. People v. Flaningan, 347 Ill.
328, 179 N. E. 823 (1932).
60. People v. Kettles, 221 Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472 (1906).
61. DUllard v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866 (1921).
62. McBride v. Clark, 101 N. J. L. 213, 127 Atl. 550 (1925).
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guide controlling administrative discretion in these cases. There are
so many considerations, many of which are unforeseeable, which would
be material for the administrator when considering the fitness of an
applicant for a license to practice medicine, dentistry, or conduct an
employment bureau, that to attempt to regulate his discretion by detailed
legislative prescriptions would be impossible. To attempt to do so would
be to deprive the administrator of that elasticity of discretion essential
to his work. The only restriction necessary to prevent arbitrariness is
that imposed by the court, that is, "reasonableness."
From the few examples given above it appears that our courts have
placed similar cases in different classifications. As appears in the preceding paragraphs, the rule requiring an express norm or standard more
definite than unguided discretion has been applied by some courts to
statutes regulating theatres and motion pictures. On the other hand,
statutes controlling upon theatres and motion pictures have been classified
under the privilege rule, resulting in the judicial implication of reasonableness as the norm or standard to be satisfied. This is an indication
of greater willingness on the part of some courts to grant administrative
freedom than prevails in others. A reading of these cases would delight
the realist who argues that the court first decides and then, by ex post
facto reasoning, justifies his decision. One does suspect that the court
has unstated reasons for its actual decision and places the case in one
class or the other because of its decision, rather than from a close study
as to which class the case really belongs.
There remains the last division in the five classifications of cases,
wherein the courts have presented the problem as to the validity of a
statute creating an administrative agency in which the statute contains
no regulation of the discretion granted. In this division we have cases
wherein the administrative agency is granted jurisdiction upon the
appearance, subsequently, of a stated fact or condition.3 The statutes
of this type leave to the agency the task of deciding whether or not the
stated fact or condition has arisen. It is within the discretion of the
agency to decide whether or not that fact or condition has arisen. The
rule is that if the legislative body makes the law, the mere fact that its
application is dependent upon a fact or condition subsequently found
to exist by an administrator, will not invalidate the statute, even if
unguided discretion is left to the administrator' 4
Two leading United States Supreme Court cases are illustrative of
63. The Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1813); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (IS91);
Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
announced in The Aurora, 7 Cranch 332 (U. S.
64. The rule seems to have been first

1813).
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this type of administrative delegation. In Field v. Clark, 6 Congress
delegated work to the President as an administrative officer. A federal
statute was passed which imposed certain stated duties on certain imported products, but the specified duties were not to be imposed unless
the foreign country shipping these specified products to the United
States levied unequal duties upon products of the same nature shipped
from this country to their shores. To the President was delegated the
duty of ascertaining whether or not the foreign country levied such
unequal duties. 66 Here, the President was given some discretion, which
the statute left uncontrolled. He necessarily had to determine whether
or not the goods were of the same nature and whether the reciprocal
duties were unequal. His discretion was unguided by the statute. The
Supreme Court sustained the statute. The second case is Hampton v.
United States.6 7 Herein was presented to the court the question as to
the validity of the flexible clause in the Tariff Act of 1922. By the terms
of that Act, the President was empowered to raise or lower the duty on
certain stated commodities so as to equalize the cost of producing the
article abroad, plus the cost of shipping it to this country with the cost
of producing the article here. In other words Congress had fixed the
standard by which the tariff was to be arrived at; it was to be sufficient
to equalize the cost of production for sale in this country. For example,
if the cost of production in a foreign country became so low that when
the cost of production abroad plus the cost of transportation plus the
present tariff imposed here enabled the foreign producer to undersell our
domestic producer, the duty had to be raised. But even though Congress
had generally, fixed the tariff at an amount sufficient to equalize cost
for sale here, it had granted to the President the widely discretionary
field of ascertaining cost here and cost abroad. The statute left this to
his unguided discretion, not stating what considerations should control
him in ascertaining cost. The Supreme Court sustained this statute.
In each case the Supreme Court held that Congress had made a law,
the application of which only was left to the President upon his deter65. 143 U. S. 649 (1891).
66. See discussion in Sigler, loc. cit. supra note 43.
67. 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
The Field case and the Hampton case are easily distinguishable from Panama
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), in that if thel statutory condition subsequent
in the former two cases arose the administrative agent had to act; his discretion
in deciding that the condition subsequent had occurred. In the Panama Refining

Refining
specified
lay only
Co. case,

the. administrative agent was authorized to act if the condition subsequent occurred, He
might or might not act and no nofn or guide was given as to when he should and
when he should not act. The Supreme Court properly invalidated the creating statute
in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.
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mining subsequently that a stated fact or condition had arisen. But in
each instance and particularly in the Hampton case, the President was
given a wide and unguided discretion. Did the court usurp power or
impede the efficiency of administrative action in these cases?
Before leaving the question as to the extent to which our courts have
intervened in dealing with the validity of statutes creating administrative
bodies, it would be well to consider briefly some rules closely related to
those already discussed.
Thus far we have been considering state statutes dealt with by state
courts, and federal statutes considered by federal courts. Suppose a
case involving a state statute goes through the state courts and an appeal
is taken to the United States Supreme Court on a constitutional issue.
What questions will be considered by our Supreme Court? If a state
court has decided that a statute has a sufficient norm or standard, the
Supreme Court will be bound by the construction given by the state
court to its own statute.'s Even if there is no construction of the state
statute by the state court, the mere absence of a norm or guide which
might permit arbitrariness is not a federal question.CP The Supreme
Court is not concerned with unrestricted delegation by a state legislature
or the violation of the principle of the separation of powers within a
state. The only federal jurisdiction present when a state administrative
statute is attacked is to be found either in the "due process" clause or
the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Under these rules then, it will be of no avail for a party attacking a
state administrative statute in a federal court to assail its lack of norm
and possible arbitrariness. He must show that in its opcration he has
been deprived of property without due process of law or has been denied
equal protection of the law. Abstracts from three well-known United
States Supreme Court cases will illustrate the difference between two
cases where there is no federal jurisdiction and one where it is present.
In Gundling v. Chicago the court wrote:
"It seems somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff in error is in a position
6S. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900); Reetz v. Ilichigan, 185 U. S. $05
(1903); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn, 232 U. S. 531 (1914); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S.

603 (1927).
69. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 133 (1900).
70. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn, 232 U. S. 531 (1914).

Of course it must be observed that if the state adminitrative statute dashes with any
other restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution on state authority, these reatrictive
clauses wUll be recognized and applied by the Supreme Court. For example, an adminis-

trative statute offending the ex Post facto or impairment of contract clauws of the
Federal Constitution would be held unconstitutional. Crowell v. Benson, 235 U. S. 22
(1932) and Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900).
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to raise the question of the invalidity of the ordinance because of the alleged
arbitrary power of the mayor to grant or refuse it. He has made no application
for a license, and of course the mayor has not refused it. Non constat, that he
would have refused it if application had been made by the plaintiff in error.
Whether the discretion is arbitrary or not would seem to be unimportant to
the plaintiff in error so long as he has made no application for the exercise
of the discretion in his favor and was not refused a license." 71
More definite is the statement appearing in Plymouth Coal Company v.
Pennsylvania wherein the court wrote:
"We may once more repeat, what has so often been said, that one who
would strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must
show that the alleged unconstitutional feature operates so as to deprive him
of rights protected by the Federal Constitution." 7 2
In these two cases the Supreme Court denied itself jurisdiction when an
administrative statute was attacked because the attack was based upon
only possible arbitrariness. But in Yick Wa v. Hopkins78 where an
ordinance (granting unguided discretion) prohibited the operation of a
laundry in other than brick buildings without a permit, the testimony
adduced in the state court made it clear that the ordinance in operation
had denied equal protection of the law to Chinese residents of San
Francisco. The court sustained the party attacking the statute in operation. The distinction is apparent. In the Gundling and the Plymouth
cases there was the mere grant of arbitrary power involved and that
does not present a federal question. But in the Yick Wo case, the
arbitrary power had been exercised; that does present a federal question.
Equal protection of the law had been denied in the Yick Wo case.
If a state statute, not involving any delegation of power to an administrative body, were to deny equal protection of the law or deprive a
person of property without due process of law the United States Supreme
Court would hold it unconstitutional. Certainly it cannot be soundly,
or even seriously, argued that administrative delegation should cast a
protecting shroud about legislation which in operation denies equal
71. 177 U. S.183, 186 (1900).
It seems clear that cases such as these are merely applying the federal rule in constitutional law set down in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) that the party
who invokes the judicial power of the Supreme Court "must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Id. at 488. Cf. United States
v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
72. 232 U. S. 531, 544 (1914).
73. 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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protection of law or deprives a person of property without due process.
When our federal courts step in only upon these constitutional grounds,
can they truthfully be said to usurp power or interfere unnecessarily
with the proper functioning of state administrative bodies?
Lastly, and probably most demonstrative of the judicial spirit of noninterference, there is the rule that the court will not substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature or the administrative agency in
passing a rule or regulation. 74 The courts do not, and in theory cannot,
concern themselves with the policy of the statute or correctness of the
conclusion of the administrative board in passing a regulation or in
deciding an issue after a hearing. That the court would have legislated
differently will not alone furnish a basis for interference."
The Validity of the Administrative Regulation
In the previous section we were concerned with the question-has the
legislature attempted to delegate too much power to the administrative
body? In this section the problem is-has the administrative agency
attempted to assume too much quasi-legislative authority? For purposes
of discussion the cases permit of the following division: (a) cases
wherein the question is as to whether the agency in passing a particular
regulation has gone beyond the scope canalized by the statute;70 (b)
cases wherein the problem is whether the regulation is a reasonable one,
having in mind the intention of the legislature in enacting the creating
statute; 77 and (c) cases wherein the regulation raises a problem of
constitutionality."
(a) Has the agency exceeded its power? This question arose in
MacMillan v. Railroad Conviission of Texas,70 In re Melea,0 and
Waite v. Macy.81
In the MacMillan case, a state statute authorized the Railroad Commission of Texas to make rules and regulations to conserve oil and pre74. Southern Pacific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537 (1913); Louisville & Nashville
Ry. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 293 (1913); Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 82
Cal. 286, 22 Pac. 910 (1890).
75. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739 (1899).
76. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918); In re Mellea, S F. (2d) 6S7 (E. D. Mich.
1925); Macillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d) 400 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
77. Universal Battery Company v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 (1930); McCaughn
v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 433 (1931).
78. Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); St.
Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
79. 51 F. (2d) 400 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
So. 5 F. (2d) 687 (E. D. Mich. 1925).
81. 246 U. S. 606 (1918).
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vent its physical waste. The statute expressly excepted any economic
control from the jurisdiction of the commission. The commission passed
a regulation restricting the oil output to a specified number of barrels
per acreage unit. The regulation ignored the number of wells driven.
In other words, a producer with a tremendous investment due to the
number of wells driven in one twenty acre unit was restricted to the
same output as a producer who had a much smaller investment in a
similar sized unit. The commission's purpose was to control production
and thereby control price. The court in holding the regulation invalid
wrote:
"In the light of such long established policy and of the language of the oil
conservation statute itself, excluding from the statutory definition 'economic
waste,' we think it plain that whether the Legislature could lawfully have
exercised this power, either directly or through delegation of it to the commission, it has not only confided the exercise of it to the commission, but has
flatly withheld such power from it. In short, we believe that the orders in
question are unreasonable and void as to plaintiffs because issued in the
attempted exercise, not of delegated, but of usurped powers. As usurpations,
under the authority of the statutes of Texas authorizing this suit, we strike
'82
them down."
It will be noted that the court held the regulations in question void,
because they were beyond the scope of power given to the commission
under the enabling statute.
In the Mellea case, the United States Labor Department had passed
a regulation requiring those filing notices of intention to become citizens
to file therewith certificates of arrival. This regulation was made under
the general provision of the Naturalization Laws giving the Secretary
of Labor "power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
for properly carrying into execution the various provisions of this act."88
The court, in holding the regulation to be beyond the scope of authority
entrusted to the Secretary of Labor, said:
a.. . yet nowhere is there any requirement nor suggestion (nor language
from which such a requirement or suggestion can be inferred) that a declaration
of intention must be accompanied by a so-called certificate of arrival or by
any other document or instrument
in order to entitle the alien presenting such
84
declaration to have it filed."1
Here the court also turned to the rule of unreasonableness to strike down
the regulation.
82.
83.
84.

MacMillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d) 400, 405 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
34 STAT. 606 (1906); 8 U. S. C. A. § 356 (1934).
In re Mellea, 5 F. (2d) 687, 689 (E. D. Mich. 1925).
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In the Waite case, a statute prohibited the importation of tea which
was found to be inferior in "purity, quality and fitness."' 5 The statute
created a Tea Board and empowered it to enforce the provisions of the
statute by appropriate regulations. The Board made a regulation whereunder any tea having coloring in it would be rejected. The plaintiff's
tea had coloring matter in it, known as "prussian blue." It was shown
that this was not deleterious to the quality of the tea. It further appeared
that the tea was above the minimum standard of tea as required by
samples kept by the Board. The court in holding the regulation void
wrote:
"...but it is equally true that the board cannot enlarge the powers given
to it by statute and cover a usurpation by calling it a decision on purity,
quality or fitness for consumption. '8 6
In connection with this rule prohibiting administrative bodies from
usurping power not granted to them, a few related decisions have been
made announcing the rule that the administrative agency may not by
change or alter the provisions of the parent statute creating
regulation
it.8 7 This would seem to be a detailed application of the general rule
against usurpation. Certainly the agency may not take upon itself the
power to change the creating statutePSS
(b) The unreasonable regulationrule. The courts have decided that
any administrative regulation which is unreasonable is void.P The
reasoning generally is that, if the regulation is under all the circumstances void, the legislature never intended to grant administrative
power to pass itP° This rule, in the light of the reason behind it, would
seem to be a part of the general rule discussed in (a) just preceding.
The rule of unreasonableness was applied in UniversalBattery Company
2
v. United States9 1 and McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate CoP
In the Universal Battery Company case an administrative regulation
35. 35 STA.T. 163 (190); 21 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1934).
S6. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 603 (191S).
87. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.

S. 129 (1936).
83. Koffland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936).
89. International Railway Co. v. Davidson, 257 U. S. 506 (1922); Universal Battery
Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. SSO (1930); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co, 233
U. S. 483 (1931); Edison Storage Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. CL 543 (1929). Se Wettach, Labor Law Administration in Pennsylvania (1922) 70 U. or Pa.. L. Pr. 277, 293
el seq.
90. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 237 U. S. 77 (1932).
91. 231 U. S. 580 (1930).
92. 283 U. S. 438 (1931).
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passed by the Internal Revenue Bureau under Section 900 (3) of the
Internal Revenue Act was attacked for alleged unreasonableness. Subdivision (3) of Section 900 taxed parts and accessories of motor vehicles,
inter alia. The Internal Revenue Bureau defined parts and accessories
as articles primarily adapted for use on motor vehicles. Occasional use
otherwise would not prevent it from being an accessory and individual
use infrequently as an accessory would not make it such. In holding
the regulation reasonable the court wrote:
"Certainly it would be unreasonable to hold that articles equally adapted
to a variety of uses and commonly put to such uses, one of which is in motor
vehicles, must be classified as parts or accessories for such vehicles and it
would be also unreasonable to hold that articles can be so classified only where
they are adapted solely for use in motor vehicles and are exclusively so used." 3
In the Hershey case a subdivision of Section 900 of the Internal
Revenue Act placed a tax on "candy" and the Bureau defined candy
as "sweet chocolate and sweet milk chocolate, whether plain or mixed
with fruit or nuts" and excluded from the tax all sweet chocolate which
obviously would not be consumed in the condition or form in which it
was sold, such as large chocolate animals. The reasonableness of this
regulation was attacked. The court in upholding the regulations as
reasonable considered (1) the age 4 of the regulation (12 years), and
(2) the fact that Congress had re-enacted the Revenue Act after this
regulation had been in force for some time and did not amend the act
in any way to change this existing administrative regulation.
(c) Constitutionality. The administrative absolutists become genuinely lachrymose in their cry of judicial usurpation in this field."0 The
two decisions which cause particular lamentation are Ohio Valley Water
Company v. Ben Avon BoroughT and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States." Suffice to say that both cases are rate cases and that
the Supreme Court in each case refused to be bound by the factual
administrative findings as to the value of property in fixing a fair return.
In the Ben Avon case the findings of fact made by the Public Service
Commission of Pennsylvania were to be final"0 under the statute, and
93. Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580, 583 (1930).
94. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 492 (1930).
95. Id. at 492 and 493. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936); United States
v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932).
96. See Landis, Adnnistrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YA..n L..J. 519;
Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YaE,L. 3. 577;
Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALEB L. J. 892.
97.
98.

253 U. S. 287 (1920).
298 U. S. 38 (1936).

99.

See Ohio Valley Company v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 289 (1920).
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likewise the factual findings of the Secretary of Agriculture in the St.
Joseph Stock Yards case were given statutory finality.10 0 Was the court
correct in refusing to be bound by the finding as to value when the issue
of confiscation of property was raised?
Rate-making is legislative action; 1" hence the function of an administrative board in fixing rates is quasi-legislative. 1 2 The findings of fact
by a legislature prior to the passage of a statute are accorded a presumption of correctness and this is true whether the legislature is acting
itself or is active through an administrative agency 03 But if a legislature passes a statute directly which deprives a person of property
without due process or denies equal protection of the laws, the court
will strike it down and will examine the factual set-up sufficiently to
ascertain whether or not there is unconstitutionality. The court will do
likewise where the legislature acts through an administrative body. A
legislature cannot save its action from judicial scrutiny by delegating
to an administrative body and providing in the creating statute that the
actions of that body shall be free from judicial review." The extreme
administratists do not argue against the jurisdiction of our courts to
strike down for unconstitutionality. They rather contend that our courts
are reaching out too far to find unconstitutionality; that going behind
administrative findings of fact to find unconstitutionality is judicial
usurpation.'0 5 But to admit that a court may strike down for unconstitutionality and then to deny the court the power to examine into the
facts to ascertain whether there is unconstitutionality is mere verbiage.
How can a court discover unconstitutionality or the lack of it unless
it looks into certain factual questions inherently involved in the very
issue it has before it.'0 6 For instance, in this rate-making field, if there
has been confiscation there is unconstitutionality and the court has
jurisdiction. But the only issue under the claim of confiscation is one
of proper valuation. If the court is precluded from going into valuation,
it is prevented from passing upon confiscation and hence unconstitutionality may escape judicial condemnation. The court is certainly
correct in penetrating attempted administrative finality when a "constitutional" fact is in issue. How empty would be the principle that
our courts may invalidate confiscatory legislation or regulation if we
100. See 298 U. S. 38, 51, 52, 82 (1936).
101. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1903).
102. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
103. Id. at 51.
104. Ibid.
105. Landis, loc. cit. supra note 96.
106. See St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 293 U. S. 38, 52-63 (1936).
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are to deny the court the privilege of ascertaining whether confiscation
has or will occur under the attacked legislation or regulation.
The argument'0 7 of the dissenting opinion in the St. Joseph Stockyards
case, drawing an analogy from the finality of jury verdicts before appellate courts, seems unsound. The argument is that if the findings of fact
of non-expert jurymen may be effectively made final and binding upon
appellate courts, certainly the factual findings of expert administrators
may be rendered conclusive. There is no analogy between a jury verdict
and the factual finding of an administrative body. The verdict of a
jury may meet with judicial supervision at three points during the course
of the trial. At the end of the plaintiff's case upon a motion to dismiss
the court must decide whether there is at least a question of fact to go
to the jury on the elements essential to make out a prima facie case;
secondly, the court must pass upon the question as to whether there is
anything to submit to the jury on a motion to direct a verdict; and
thirdly, when the motion to set the verdict aside is made, the court
passes upon the question as to whether the jury's verdict is contrary
to the weight of the evidence. The factual findings of an administrative
body are subject to no judicial supervision until they are brought over
into the judicial realm.
Another Supreme Court decision has caused wide discussion and
comment and most of it has been adverse. In Crowell v. Benson'0 8 a
workmen's industrial commission had under statutory authority granted
an alleged employee a compensation award because of injuries sustained
by that employee. The jurisdiction of the commission depended upon
the existence of the relationship of employer and employee. The
Supreme Court held that the judiciary was not bound by the finding of
*the commissioner on the issue of the existence of this relationship and
should ascertain the presence of this "jurisdictional" fact itself. Two
distinguishing characteristics of the Crowell case should be mentioned.
First, the function of the administrative agency was quasi-judicial, rather
than quasi-legislative. It is mentioned here because it is commonly
associated with the Ben Avon case and the St. Joseph Stock Yards case
in attacks upon decisions of the Supreme Court relative to administrative
law questions. Secondly, it does not raise a question of constitutionality,
it rather raises a question which would be more appropriately considered
under subdivision (a), i.e., action by an agency which is beyond the
scope of its authority. In this case the Supreme Court holds that not
only is the judiciary empowered to examine for usurpation of power
by an administrative body, but that the judiciary may make its own
107.
108.

See 298 U. S. 38, 73 (1936), Brandies, J., concurring.
285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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findings of fact in so far as the existence of essential jurisdictional facts
is concerned. The decision to this extent is sound. It would again be
an empty principle which would allow the judiciary to invalidate a
regulation or order which was beyond the scope of authority granted
to the issuing agency if the judiciary was to be bound by the conclusions
of fact arrived at by the agency which are material in the establishment
of the existence of the required jurisdiction.
It is difficult to find judicial usurpation when our courts protect the
individual from the regulation of an administrative agency which (a) is
beyond its power to make, (b) is unreasonable or (c) is unconstitutional.
If the judiciary isn't empowered to do this and to break through administrative fact finding to do it adequately, there is no check upon an
unscrupulous or political commission.
The Procedure in Enacting an Administrative Regulation
This last division in the process of making an administrative regulation or order submits itself to three outstanding questions. Does proper
procedure in arriving at administrative quasi-legislation require that
there be (1) a hearing, (2) findings, (3) promulgation?
(1) The necessity of a hearing.0 0 When an administrative body
is performing an adjudicative function, it is the general rule that a
hearing must be afforded in determining his rights. 10 For instance,
when a person claiming to be a citizen is brought before a commission
of the labor department on deportation charges, that commission is acting
in an adjudicative capacity and the defendant is entitled to a hearing. 1 '1
But our subject matter concerns itself with the making of administrative
regulations binding upon unnamed and in many instances, at the time
of the regulation, parties unknown to the administrative body. It is the
general judicial, as distinguished from statutory, rule that no hearing
109. See Goodnow, Private Rights and Admimistrati, Dicrction (1916) 41 A. B. A.
RE.P. 40S; Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36 Hv. L. R"v. 405; Note, The
Necessity of a Notice and Hearing in Administrative Detcrmninriors (1931) .0 U. o.
PA. L. rmv. 96; (1935) 8 SouTnrme. CAns=. L. REv. 330. See also, Dxc rso:q, Anz.asTRAMT JusncE Aam = Surrn uc" or L.. (1927) cc. I, V; Frxu-.m, Porim; Pov=n
1904 §§ 520-528; MosT, Dom PRocEss or LAV (1926) 226.
110. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1903); Norwegian Nitrogen Products v.
United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933); Hagar v. Reclamation, 111 U. S. 701 (1234); Nickey
v. Mlississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934); Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N. E. 474 (1839);
Copcutt v. Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1S93).
111. United States v. Ju Toy, 193 U. S. 253 (1905); Chin Yow v. United States, 203
U. S. 8 (19os). Further, it is argued that the issue of citizenship must have judicial

determination. See dissenting opinion in United States v. Ju Toy, supra; Moy Sucy v.
United States, 147 Fed. 697 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906); United States v. Dart, 251 Fed. 394
(D. Ga. 1918).
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is required prior to the enactment of an administrative regulation or
order." 2 The usual judicial reasoning arriving at this rule is that since
the legislature is not bound to conduct a hearing before making law
itself, no hearing is essential when the legislature is acting through its
administrative agent in the passing of a detailed regulation or order.lut
There being no judicial requisite, most commissions until recent years
conducted no hearings prior to the passage of regulations or orders.
The Interstate Commerce Commission however is an exception to this
practice'" and some larger bodies have followed its formula, for example,
the Federal Trade Commission. In the so-called New Deal legislation,
in many instances the statute expressly requires a hearing before the
issuance of orders or regulations."" For instance the Agricultural
Adjustment Act as amended in 1935 expressly required hearings before
the issuance of certain orders and the Bituminous Coal Act explicitly
required hearings before the making of "a rule or regulation which has
the force and effect of law.""'
The Trade Agreements Act and the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act also contain requisites of hearings
before an order or regulation becomes effective." 7 To some extent these
statutory requisites are thought to be due to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Panama Refining case. 1 8
Certainly there has been no judicial usurpation or interference with
administrative efficiency in this area. The administrative agencies voluntarily, at first, and then under statutory compulsion have gone much
further than the rules imposed by the judiciary required. The admin112. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (1885); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904); Bi-metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
239 U. S. 441 (1915). See Black, Is the Test of the Reasonableness of an 'Adminktralive
Determination Subjective or Objective? (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. RFv. 601, 607.
113. Feller, supra note 7; BIACHLY & OATMAw, op. cit. sUpra note 11. See recommendations in A. B. A., 1938 Anv. PROGRAM, 165. The proposed statute required a hearing of
all parties interested.
114. Feller, supra note 7, at 659.
115. The various codes of the National Recovery Act provided for hearings. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act provided for hearings. See § 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 49 STAT. 753 (1935), 7 U. S. C. A. § 608 (c) (1939). The Bitu.
minous Coal Act provides that "no rule or regulation which has the force and effect
of law, shall be made or prescribed by the Commission, unless it has given reasonable

public notice of a hearing, and unless it has afforded to interested parties an opportunity
to be heard, and unless it has made findings of fact." 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 1 U. S. C. A.
§ 829 (1939). See also the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STAT. 977 (1935), 27
U. S. C. A. 201 (Supp. 1938); the Trade Agreements Act, 48 STAT. 945 (1934), 19 U. S.
C. A. § 1354 (1937).
116. Note 115, supra.
117. Ibid.
118. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Feller, supra note 7, at 660.
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istrative bodies followed the example of the legislature in conducting
hearings pending the enactment of important legislation.
We now have commissions granting hearings voluntarily'" and under
statutory compulsion2 0 before putting an order or regulation into effect
and others neglecting to do so. In some instances our commissions and
legislatures felt a hearing was requisite and in others it was neglected
or considered and deemed unnecessary. There necessarily arises the
question as to when a hearing is essential in this area. The Administrative Law Committee of the American Bar Association in its reports
for 19371 and 19381 thought a hearing should be a general requisite.
But there are practical difficulties in this connection. In order that the
requisite of a hearing mean anything, it must contemplate that parties
interested be given reasonable notice of the time and place of that
hearing.'3 When an administrative agency is performing an adjudicative
function, the parties interested are known or can be somewhat easily
ascertained. This is not true where the agency is about to make a general
regulation affecting many people in the future. Suppose, for instance, a
regulation was being proposed affecting farmers, could all farmers be
notified? It would be impossible and because of the great numbers, the
holding of such a meeting would result in such disorder and confusion
as to prohibit progress." 4 If an interested group was organized and
had authorized representatives, the requisite of a hearing with its concomitant reasonable notice would be practicable in so far as that'group
1
is concerned.'
Another serious difficulty might lie in determining who are interested
parties. Some might be directly interested, but the interest of others
might be very economic, even though indirect."" Suppose a farmer
who is desirous of obtaining a subsidy is about to be ordered to cultivate
only tw enty-five percent of 'his acreage, isn't the vendor of farm
machinery interested indirectly?
119. National Labor Relations Boards are granting hearings voluntarily.
120. -Note115, suPra.
121. A. B. A., 1937 Anv. PnoGasax, 183-186.
122. A. B. A., 1938 ADv.PROGRAM, 165 for the proposed Act.

supra note 12. Profesor Fuchs in discussing the question of pro.
123. Fuchs, boc. cit.
cedure in administrative rule-making submits the following comiderations: "(1) the
character of the parties affected; (2) the nature of the problems to be dealt with; (3)
the character of the administrative determination; (4) the types of administrative agencies
exercising the rule-making function; and (5) the character of enforcement which attaches
to the resulting regulations!'
124. 'Note 123, suPra.
125. See discussion in Jaffe, Law Making by Pri-.afe Groups (1937) 51 Hi,R%. L. RE%.
201.
126. Note 123, supra.
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The character of the parties affected is most important on this question of a hearing when a quasi-legislative function is being exercised
by a commission. In some instances the hearing plan is feasible. For
example, in the Interstate Commerce Commission the requisite of a
hearing can be complied with. The Commission is dealing with large
transportation companies who are now registered with it. They are
known to the commission and they are organized and represented. The
same is true of the Fair Trade Board and the Commission acting under
the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
Another practical difficulty is the tremendous added burden upon
administrative bodies with its resulting increased governmental expense.
To take one department for example-if the various commissions in the
Treasury Department were compelled to conduct hearings before issuing
every order, the additional governmental expense would be tremendous.
In Morgan v. United States' 2 the Supreme Court decided that the
Secretary of Agriculture could not properly sign an ordqr fixing maximum rates when he had not heard or read testimony or heard the
arguments. They held substantially that he who decides must hear.
This rule, if it applies to commissions and it seems that it should, 2' 8
would serve to increase the work and expense since one administrator
would be confined to one job.
The difficulty of a general requisite of hearings in this field is apparent.
It might be well to leave the matter in the discretion of the great number
of smaller agencies. Their discretion might be guided by (1) the possibility of giving notice of time and place, (2) the number to be affected,
(3) the organization of the various groups, (4) the possibility of
equitable proceeding by parties affected restraining enforcement pending
judicial action, (5) the expertness of the administrative body, rendering
unnecessary the viewpoint of laymen in formulating rules.
(2) The Necessity of Findings."' By the expression "necessity of
findings" is meant the necessity of arriving at and expressly stating in
the form of report, memorandum or decision the conclusions of fact
which the agency has found to be present.
Upon first examination of the recent cases on this question, one meets
with apparently hopeless confusion. It might be profitable to suggest
certain possible lines of distinction. Before doing this, a brief glance
at the earlier phase of the law may be of assistance. Two distinctions
seem to have been fairly well established until the Supreme Court handed
down four recent decisions. One distinction established the rule that
127.

304 U. S. 1 (1938).

128.
129.

Feller, supra note 7, at 663.
See (1935) 19 Mumr. L. Ra,. 763; (1936)

49 I-Mv. L. REv. 827.
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findings would be required where a special newly created agency was
functioning,3 0 but would not be a requisite where an executive officer,
such as the President or a cabinet member, was the administrative
agency'
This classification was based upon the presumption that the
executive officer had complied with the statutory confines imposed upon
him and that the facts necessary for his jurisdiction were present. The court intimated that a different rule would apply where the action
of a special commission was in question." The other established distinction was between the quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions
of an administrative body. The rule required findings when the action
was quasi-judicial but not where the action was quasi-legislative.'
Have these distinctions been adhered to in four recent decisionsPanwama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 13 United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R.,. "3 Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White,' 3 and Morgan v.
United States?'-s
In the Panama Refining Co. case we see the first instance of a breaking down of the two distinctions just mentioned. Section 9c of the
National Recovery Act authorized the President to prohibit the interstate transportation of oil produced or withdrawn from storage in excess
of amounts permitted by state law. The statute required no findings
and none was made by the President prior to the issuance of an order
under this section. The court held the President's order was invalid'9
and one ground of invalidity was the fact that no findings were made.
This decision ignores both of the distinctions referred to, since the order
130. Monongahela Bridge v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910). See (1935) 19
L. Rwv. 763, 764: "Thus no express finding of facts that bring the act vithin

Dl=.r.

the scope of the prescribed legislative policy is necessary, it being presumed that such
facts exist."
131. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 293 U. S. 454 (1935). See note 130,
supra at 766: "Where the delegated power is exercised by a spccial comrmiLion -whoae
orders are reviewable by the courts, the desirability of complete and explicit findings i
obvious, for they facilitate a determination of whether the board has vell exerciz:d its
power."
132. Monongahela Bridge v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910). See Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651, 660 (1892).
133. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 293 U. S. 454 (1935).
134. Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U. S. 48 (1922);
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924); Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United State3, 282
U. S. 74 (1930). See discussion in Feller, supra note 113, at 665.
135. 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
136. 293 U. S.454 (1935).
137. 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
138. 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
139. 293 U. S. 383 (1935).
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in question was an executive one, emanating from the President, and it
was also legislative in character since it operated in the future and
referred to no particular individual.
The Baltimore & Ohio R. R. case followed the trend of the Panama
case. Involved herein was the Boiler Inspection Act which empowers
the Interstate Commerce Commission to make regulations controlling
equipment upon railway locomotives which constitute "peril to life and
limb." The Commission conducted hearings and thereafter issued an
order requiring all railway locomotives above a certain size to be
equipped with power, rather than hand-reverse gears. The statute requires the Commission to make a report in writing, stating its conclusions.
The Commission made a long and apparently exhaustive report, concluding with the decision that the safety of employees and travellers
required the installation of the power gear. The order was declared
invalid because of the lack of an express finding of facts to show
specifically that the hand operated gear caused unnecessary peril to
life and limb. The court wrote that "formal and precise findings are not
required"'14 0 by the provisions of the Act, but this, the court said, does
not "remove the necessity of making, where orders are subject to judicial
review, quasi-jurisdictionalfindings essential to their constitutional or
statutory validity."' 4' This decision does not follow the second distinction, to wit, between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Here
the action of the commission was quasi-legislative; yet basic findings of
fact were required.
In the Pacific States Box case, an Oregon statute authorized the State
Department of Agriculture, after investigation and public hearing, to
fix and promulgate "official standards for containers of horticultural
products . . . in order to promote, protect, further and develop the
horticultural interests."' 4 2 The statute did not require that specific
findings of fact be made. 4 3 The State Department of Agriculture, pursuant to authority given by the statute issued an order setting certain
standards for fruit containers. The Department made no findings of
fact and the Supreme Court held that no findings were necessary. While
there is no stress laid upon the point in the decision, the distinction
between delegation to an existing department of the executive branch
I delegation to a specially created commission seems
of governr
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 293 U. S. 454, at 465 (1935).
140. Uniteu,:-es
141. ibid. (Italics inserted).
142. ORE. CODE Arx. (1930) § 18-2902"3, amended, ORE. CODE AnN. (Supp. 1935)
§ 18-3508.
143. See 296 U. S. 176, 186 (1935).
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to be followed here.'" Also the line of demarcation drawn between the
legislative and judicial functions is followed and expressly so. The court
said, "But the statute did not require special findings; doubtless because
the regulation authorized was general legislation, not an administrative
nature of a judgment directed against an individual
order in the
5
concern. "

4

In Morgan v. United States, the Secretary of Agriculture, after hearings had been conducted, issued an order prescribing maximum rates to
be charged by market agencies for buying and selling livestock at the
Kansas City Stock Yards. This action was brought to restrain the
enforcement of the rate order. It appeared at the trial that the Secretary
had not heard or read the testimony and had not heard the arguments,
that his familiarity with the case was based upon conversations had
with employees in his office. It further appeared that at the end of the
argument before the department examiner, after all evidence was in,
counsel for the plaintiff requested that a report containing the findings
of the examiner be drawn and served upon the plaintiff. This was not
done. The court held that such findings were a requisite to proper procedure in this case. This decision would seem to violate each of the
two distinctions discussed. Here was an order by an existing department
of the executive branch of the federal government rather than by a
specially created commission and the order was legislative, rather than
judicial, in character.
It seems clear, from these four recent decisions, that the former distinctions have been abandoned. Is it possible to reconcile the Pacific
States Box' 40 case with the Panama Refining Co.,14 7 Baltimore & Ohio
-54 and Morgai 40 cases and take a rule from them as to when
R. R.,
findings are required?
There would seem to be no sound distinction founded upon the fact
that a state agency was involved in the Pacific States Box case, whereas
in the other three cases the action of a federal agency was in question.
The apparent reason would seem to be that in either case the question
raised would be one of due process under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Also the principle that pro144. Ibid. The court wrote: "But where the regulation is within the seOpe of authority
legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exerciattaches alike to . . . , and to orders of administrative bodies.'
145. See 296 U. S. 176, 186 (1935).
146. 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
147. 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
143. 293 U. S. 454 (1935).
149. 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
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cedural requisites will be more rigidly adhered to in matters involving
possible criminal punishment than in ordinary civil litigation does not
assist here because a penal savor present in the Panama Refining Co.
and Baltimore & Ohio R. R. cases, was also present in the Pacific States
Box case. 150
Certainly the distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions of administrative bodies in so far as requiring findings is
concerned seems to have been weakened greatly by the Panama Refining
Co. and Baltimore & Ohio cases. But the Pacific States Box case exPresumably the rationale underlying
pressly refers to the distinction.'
this distinction is that since findings are the conclusions of fact deduced
from evidence adduced at a hearing, if no hearing is essential, a jortiorl
findings are not. As previously seen, unless otherwise provided by
statute, a hearing was not essential when an administrative body was
acting quasi-legislatively. May we assume that findings are required
where an administrative body, voluntarily or compulsorily, conducts a
hearing and may be dispensed with if no hearing is conducted in cases
where such boards are acting legislatively? This cannot be the rule
because in the Pacific States Box case a hearing was, pursuant to statute, 162 conducted and no finding was required. It would seem that findings would be more necessary to the judiciary where no hearing had
been held. If a hearing has been held the judiciary may have a transcript
of the record together with documentary proof and from these ascertain
whether the action of the body was proper. But where no hearing has
been held it would seem essential that there be findings at least of those
conclusions of fact requisite for administrative jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court made a statement in the Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
case which after analysis may prove helpful. The court wrote that
"formal and precise findings are not required,"'15 but then went on to
say that this did not "remove the necessity of making, where orders are
subject to judicial review, quasi-jurisdictional findings essential to their
constitutional or statutory validity.' ' 5 4 What does the court mean by
the words, "subject to judicial review"? The court certainly is not
distinguishing between a review expressly authorized in the administrative statute and one permitted by a common law writ. No sound distinction is present here on the question as to whether findings shall be
required. 55 The words "quasi-jurisdictional findings essential to their
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Comment, (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 827.
See 296 U. S. 176, 186 (1935).
Ibid.
293 U. S. 454, at 465 (1935).
Ibid.
Feller, supra note 113, at 668.
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[the orders] constitutional or statutory validity" are more helpful.
The court cites Florida v. United States'- wherein the court draws the
distinction which throws some light upon the question. The distinction
was there made between what may be termed quasi-jurisdictional or
basic facts and a "complete statement of the grounds of the Commission's
determination."' 1 7 Findings as to the former were held essential; as
to the latter, while findings might be desirable, they were not essential.
From this point of view the fundamental test in determining whether
findings shall be required would seem to be-are they requisite for
proper judicial review? In the PanamaRefining Co. case the court could
not ascertain whether the basic jurisdictional facts were present without
findings. It could not even determine that the President had based his
action upon a belief that oil had been produced beyond the amount
allowed by state law. In the Baltimore & Ohio R. R. case the finding
required by the court was essential to show that the body had at least
believed it had jurisdiction, i.e., that it believed a hand-reverse gear
constituted an "unnecessary peril to life and limb,"'18 which was essential
in order that the agency might have jurisdiction under the statute. But
in the Pacific States Box case it was apparent when the order itself was
placed parallel with the statute that the agency had jurisdictionYi 9 The
statute gave it jurisdiction to regulate fruit containers and that is all that
the order accomplished. That findings must be present when necessary
for a proper judicial review would seem generally to be the court's rule.
Certainly the courts are not unnecessarily impairing the efficiency of administrative bodies in imposing this requisite.
The necessity of promidgation. The term is used here to mean
(3)
the publication of administrative orders. In this respect this country
has been, and still is, exceedingly laggard. In England as far back as
1890 administrative rules were required to be published.0 0 In 1893 the
English Rules Publication Act was passed.' 0 But in the United States
it was not until the National Recovery Administration, the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, and other New Deal agencies showered the
country with administrative regulations and orders that we finally saw
136. 282 U. S. 194 (1931).
157. 282 U. S. 194, at 215 (1931).
153. See 293 U. S. 454, at 463 (1935).
159. It is interesting to note that in the other three cases-, the Morgan, Panama Refining Company, and Baltimore & Ohio R.R. cases, there was at least one other ground
given for holding the administrative action void.
160. See discussion in Griswold, Government in Ignorance of Law-A Pica for Better
Publication of Executive Legislation (1934) 48 HLRv. L. Rrv. 193; see also Legm. (1936)
49 EARnv. L. R. 1209; 44 Gno. WASH. L. REv. 26S (1936).
161. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 66 (1593).
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the need of some systematic publication. On July 26, 1935, the Federal
Register Act was approved. The first issue of the Federal Register appeared on March 14, 1936.102 The American Bar Association through
its Special Committee on Administrative Law in its reports has continuously pleaded for this reforms1s and has incorporated this requisite in
proposed federal administrative law legislation.P,
The Federal Register Act applies only to federal legislation. The
myriad rules and regulations annually enacted by the multiple state and
municipal boards are still not published systematically. True the more
important agencies do voluntarily publish their regulations in leaflet or
pamphlet form.165 The need for such publication is evident when a citizen
does not know of the existence of a regulation until he is notified and
probably punished for its violation. The legal presumption of knowledge
of the law is rendered more ridiculous than ever when it is applied
against a citizen who could not learn even of the existence of the particular "law."
If systematic publication of administrative regulations cannot be had
in the various states, the public might be apprised by requiring legislative
approval of all, or the more important administrative regulations before
they could become effective.106 In this way the act of the legislature
would be recorded in the usual way and this record would sufficiently
form the basis for the presumption of legal knowledge if it didn't actually apprise the lawyer or the citizen. That some state legislation on this
subject is needed must be conceded even by the most vigorous administrative absolutist.
Conclusion
From the foregoing collection of cases and materials it would seem
that an impartial unbiased mind would conclude that our courts have
neither impinged upon the administrative domain nor have they unnecessarily retarded the progress of administrative bodies. If accomplishment whether right or wrong is the zenith of administrative action,
then justice based upon fundamental principles, drawn from the natural
law intuitive in everyone, is to be disregarded. Our courts have recognized the necessity of government by administrative action in several
TRmauNs (1937) 420
162. See comment by Stason, Tnz LAW oF ADN=NxsmtTA
et seq.
163. (1934) 59 A. B. A. J. 552-555.
164. A. B. A. J., 1938 ADv. P OGR=, 164-6.
165. The Workmen's Compensation Commissions and the Boards of Health do, In
the larger communities, publish new regulations.
166. This has been suggested as an effective check upon administrative regulations. See
B .AcHLY & OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 82-88.
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fields. Their co-operative attitude from the outset is evidenced by the
legal inventions-quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial-which were created in order that administrative regulations might survive. Any further
judicial abdication would be most hazardous and result in increased disrespect for law and authority. The contemptuous victor as well as the
victimized loser would lose respect for law and order. It is well that we
keep judicial integrity, knowledge and sapience on its present front in administrative law. It has retreated far enough in the interest of mere
speed.

